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Credit Risk Spillovers, Systemic Importance and Vulnerability in
Financial Networks*
Inna Grinis1
Abstract
How does the change in the creditworthiness of a financial institution or sovereign im-
pact its creditors′ solvency? I address this question in the context of the recent European
sovereign debt crisis. Considering the network of Eurozone member states, interlinked through
investment cross-holdings, I model default as a multi-stage disease with each credit-rating
corresponding to a new infection phase, then derive systemic importance and vulnerability
indicators in the presence of financial contagion, triggered by the change in the creditworthi-
ness of a network member. I further extend the model to analyse not only negative, but also
positive credit risk spillovers.
JEL classification: F34, G01, G15.
Keywords: financial networks, systemic risk, contagion, multi-stage disease.
This version: November 2014
Final version forthcoming in Complexity Economics
1 Introduction
Why does the downgrade of a European country not only raise the CDS spreads of that specific
sovereign but also those of other Eurozone member states (Arezki et al. (2011))? More generally,
how does the change in the creditworthiness of a financial institution or state impact its creditors′
solvency?
This paper addresses such questions, investigating how a financial event that originates in one
specific country can spread beyond its borders, infecting other states like an epidemic. I model
default as a process - a multi-stage disease. Each credit-rating corresponds to an infection phase,
during which default happens and therefore contagion is transmitted with a certain probability
(Section 2). The model is general and could be applied not only to sovereigns, but to any financial
institutions such as banks, firms, etc. interlinked by mutual financial liabilities. However, given
data availability and recent events, I illustrate its workings in the context of the European sovereign
debt crisis. The seventeen member states are the nodes in the network, and the weighted directed
edges between them measure cross-country investment flows (Fig.1).
My goal is to develop indicators of node importance and vulnerability by investigating how
the exogenous change in the creditworthiness of one of the financial network members impacts the
creditworthiness of all the other ones (Section 3). Firstly, I derive some analytical indices from
the early time properties of the model, then I employ computer simulations to measure systemic
1Department of Economics and SRC, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street,
London, WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: I.Grinis@lse.ac.uk.
*I am grateful to the Financial Markets Group at the LSE and the Deutsche Bank for awarding me the runner-up
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for supervising my undergraduate thesis at the University of Cambridge, during which many of the ideas further
developed here originated, and that won the 2013 Adam Smith Best Dissertation Prize. This work was supported
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importance and vulnerability. Both indicators are systemic in the sense that they not only capture
the immediate effect of the “exogenous risk that hits the system” (such as an aggregate exogenous
shock or an idiosyncratic shock to one of the nodes in the network), but also the “endogenous risk
generated by the system itself” (Zigrand (2014)). The system here is the network and the aim is
to find indicators that will take into account how the structure of the links shapes and propagates
an initial exogenous shock. I also extend the model to analyse how the same feedback mechanisms
that generate endogenous risk, could set off a process of positive contagion, reversing negative
market sentiments (Section 4).
This paper can be related to the existing vast literature on financial contagion. At the two
extremes, contagion is classified as pure - when a herd of investors drives apparently healthy and
unrelated economies towards sunspot equilibria - or fundamentals-based (Masson (1999)). In reality
however, spillovers are complex and encompass both features: they spread through real or financial
channels, while still retaining some randomness driven by market sentiments. I try to capture this
duality by on the one hand considering a financial network of cross-country investment flows, while
on the other hand making downgrades happen stochastically. Indeed, the probability that an agent
transmits the “default disease” to its network neighbours depends on both: its actual credit rating
(an agent with a lower credit-rating, i.e. in a more advanced infection phase, transmits the negative
contagion at a higher rate) and the interaction intensities (a stronger mutual relation increases the
transmission probability).2
One of the first models studying financial contagion on networks is Allen & Gale (2000). The
authors extend Diamond & Dybvig (1983) to a four banks system, showing how the completeness
and distribution of interconnections determine the extent of spillovers following a bank-specific
shock. With evenly allocated deposits, contagion may be completely avoided, whereas in an
incomplete system, a cascade of failures might emerge. Allen & Babus (2009) give an overview of
some recent developments in this field. Espinosa-Vega & Sole (2011) build an interbank exposure
model, simulating credit and liquidity shocks. Their algorithm starts with the default of a country′s
banking system shifting the balance sheets of yet solvent banks and triggering new failures. In
a similar spirit, Elliott et al. (2014) construct a theoretical model in which the market values
of organisations are interdependent through the network of cross-holdings. The default of an
organisation (bank or country) changes the values of all the other ones inducing those, whose new
values fall below certain specified “bankruptcy thresholds”, to fail as well. The contagion process
continues until either the algorithm converges with no new failures, or no solvent organisation
remains.
One of the main criticisms of such studies has been their limited scope given the “extremely
rare” nature of “contagious failures” (Upper (2006)). Here, instead of analysing how financial
contagion results from the initial default of a bank or country, I model the default process itself,
and investigate how financial contagion can be triggered by simple changes in the creditworthiness
of one of the network members.
The credit-rating determination of a bank (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick & Treepongkaruna (2009))
or a sovereign (Melliosa & Paget-Blanc (2006), Afonso (2003), Cheung (1996)) have been tradi-
tionally studied using econometric ordered-response models with creditworthiness as the latent
variable. The problem with this approach is that it completely ignores the possibility of credit risk
spillovers between financial entities. Unfortunately, once we model agents′ interactions explicitly
2For a discussion of the relative importance of trade linkages versus macroeconomic similarities in currency crises,
see Eichengreen et al. (1996). Gerlach & Smets (1995), Corsetti et al. (1999), and Pesenti & Tille (2000) present
theoretical models of contagious transmission with applications to the Asian currency crisis and the ERM turmoil.
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through a network, and admit that their creditworthiness levels are interrelated and determined
simultaneously, this econometric framework can no longer be used because of endogeneity.
I propose a different approach to studying creditworthiness and credit risk spillovers that takes
inspiration from the epidemiology literature. Indeed, the highly interconnected and complex na-
ture of the global financial system has spurred researchers to draw interesting and original par-
allels between financial networks, ecosystems (May et al. (2008)), epidemiology, and even engi-
neering (Haldane (2009)). Demiris et al. (2014) explore financial contagion in the context of a
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model, emphasising its advantages over more conventional
modelling approaches. In particular, the SIR framework allows them to model explicitly the
country-interdependencies that are essential to the propagation of a crisis, measure crisis sever-
ity by a threshold parameter instead of composite macroeconomic indicators as in Kaminsky &
Reinhart (1998), and evaluate potential policy interventions.
Beside these theoretical advances, an increased interest in complexity economics and agent-
based modelling have recently re-emphasized the usefulness of computer simulations in under-
standing complex systems (Farmer & Foley (2009)). For instance, Caporale et al. (2008) develop
a multinomial model using time series data on stock returns during the East Asian crisis (1997),
and thereby disentangle potentially destabilizing connections that could signal the inception of a
contagion process. Gai et al. (2011) experiment with different parameter configurations, studying
how complexity and concentration affect the resilience of a financial system. I follow this trend and
use computer simulations not only to derive indicators of systemic importance and vulnerability,
but also to incorporate positive contagion, thereby making the model more complex, interesting,
and realistic.
2 Credit Risk Spillovers
2.1 The determinants of creditworthiness
Consider a network with n ∈ N nodes. As an illustration, Figure 1 depicts the network of the
seventeen Eurozone member states. Since the ultimate goal is to study credit risk spillovers,
the links between nodes should reflect the intensity of potential contagion flows. Fig.1 looks at
the 2011 cross-border Total Portfolio Investment (TPI) flows. The data is available from the
IMF (Consolidated Portfolio Investment Survey). TPI flows are reported on an annual basis and
include long & short term equities and debt-securities. I transform the data into investment
shares since absolute values of investment flows vary with the overall size of the economy and
need to be normalised. Formally, I define the weighted, directed link from j to i (vij) as the
proportion of country i’s total investment flowing into j. Intuitively, the arcs follow contagion
flows so that the larger vij, the more significant the direct potential spillover from j’s downgrade
onto i’s creditworthiness. In Fig.1, nodes are coloured and weighted by their average degrees
1
2
{∑
i vij +
∑
j vij
}
.
Investment shares vij can be summarized in an n×n adjacency matrix V (Table 1). Note that
vii = 0 (foreign investment only) and row i gives the distribution of country i’s TPI across other
Eurozone member states. For instance, Austria invests 21.46% into Germany and only 0.64% into
Greece. Rows do not sum up to 100% because countries also invest in non-EZ states. In general,
vij 6= vji, e.g. Italy invests 26.22% into Luxembourg, while Luxembourg only invests 4.64% into
Italy.
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Figure 1: Eurozone network, 2011 Total Portfolio Investment (TPI) shares
Table 1: Adjacency matrix, 2011 Total Portfolio Investment (TPI) shares (percentages)
AUS BE CY EST FIN FR DE GRE IRE IT LUX MAL NTH PT SK SL SP
AUS 0 1.319 0.140 0.023 1.368 8.524 21.456 0.638 3.705 7.398 8.434 0.010 7.327 0.525 0.790 0.710 3.538
BE 2.265 0 0.032 0.002 0.838 18.459 6.689 0.455 5.700 4.845 19.111 0.006 14.661 0.730 0.195 0.226 5.172
CY 0.496 1.838 0 0 0.411 4.291 2.372 27.833 3.708 3.448 2.419 0 2.121 0.300 0.003 0.112 0.924
EST 3.113 3.352 0.311 0 7.328 14.679 7.328 0.096 6.346 7.807 11.997 0.024 8.357 0.431 0.455 0.216 1.461
FIN 1.425 0.668 0.036 0.094 0 8.007 10.144 0.291 5.159 2.243 8.755 0 5.742 0.398 0.022 0.079 2.156
FR 3.072 4.340 0.012 0.001 0.678 0 11.303 0.587 4.138 10.761 6.104 0.038 11.883 1.381 0.039 0.104 8.281
DE 3.865 1.415 0.042 0.002 1.053 12.668 0 0.516 5.263 7.299 16.218 0.004 9.968 0.935 0.180 0.127 6.878
GRE 0.929 0.330 3.393 0 0.052 3.284 2.727 0 2.394 1.857 7.902 0 2.242 0.296 0 0 0.641
IRE 0.358 0.544 0.009 0.008 0.594 5.374 7.174 0.144 0 5.724 2.248 0.011 3.820 2.633 0.017 0.009 2.031
IT 1.719 0.810 0.007 0 0.328 13.094 10.381 0.430 8.634 0 26.215 0.022 6.483 0.690 0.035 0.116 4.505
LUX 1.036 1.792 0.045 0.009 0.648 9.750 12.381 0.103 2.711 4.635 0 0.019 5.164 0.264 0.019 0.023 2.299
MAL 1.939 1.011 0.107 0 0.308 3.942 5.765 0.950 5.191 2.309 2.720 0 4.851 1.134 0.175 0.942 2.677
NTH 2.255 1.673 0.015 0.002 1.181 11.271 15.964 0.228 3.445 3.487 5.355 0.004 0 0.807 0.037 0.024 3.920
PT 1.372 1.762 0 0 0.416 9.599 5.298 1.327 20.645 9.603 6.566 0 7.113 0 0.050 0.028 11.795
SK 5.286 1.173 0.527 0 2.431 9.394 4.222 1.154 8.663 7.995 2.864 0 6.088 4.343 0 2.444 15.855
SL 6.269 3.923 0.040 0.015 0.805 13.337 18.605 2.721 2.348 8.654 4.082 0 7.023 0.953 1.227 0 2.259
SP 1.678 2.054 0 0 0.358 13.227 8.685 0.872 6.806 15.753 9.975 0 9.567 3.933 0 0 0
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), IMF
cf. Table 8: Geographic Breakdown of Total Portfolio Investment Assets: Total Portfolio Investment, http://cpis.imf.org/
The adjacency matrix is obtained by dividing the original entries in the CPIS matrix by the total value of investment for each country.
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Let the creditworthiness of each node at time t - y∗it- be described by:
y∗it = x
′
itβ + ω
∑
j
vijy
∗
jt (1)
where β is a vector of parameters, and xit - a vector of economic indicators that include variables
like debt ratios, growth and inflation rates, default history, etc. in the case of sovereigns. If
banks were considered instead, xit would include variables like asset quality, liquidity risk, capital
adequacy, operating performance, etc. The parameter ω captures how changes in i’s debtors’
creditworthiness will affect its own creditworthiness given i′s portfolio allocation
∑
j vij. The
model could be made more general by allowing all parameters to depend on i, reflecting the
fact that different characteristics do not necessarily have the same importance in determining the
creditworthiness of two different financial entities. However, this would make the model more
complex, and I shall leave this extension to future research.
Even though in practice many credit-rating agencies have been recently accused of assigning
credit-ratings that do not reflect the true creditworthiness of a bank or sovereign, theoretically
we can assume that there exists a direct mapping from creditworthiness to credit-ratings. Credit-
ratings are ordinal qualitative variables often designated by alphabetical letters. Standard & Poor’s
ratings for example range from AAA (no default risk) to C - the worst possible rating before the
restricted default D. Suppose there are k possible ratings in total (the actual number varies
from agency to agency). I translate credit-ratings to a numerical scale with the highest possible
rating denoted as k and the lowest possible one as 0. Financial institution i is downgraded as its
creditworthiness y∗it , defined by eq.1, drops below certain thresholds α:
crit =

k if y∗it > αk
k − 1 if αk−1 < y∗it ≤ αk
...
0 if y∗it ≤ α1
where crit is i’s credit-rating at time t.
As mentioned in the introduction, eq.1 cannot be estimated econometrically through an ordered-
response model because the sum
∑
j vijy
∗
jt - which in the context of the illustrative Eurozone
network can be interpreted as country i’s creditworthiness-adjusted portfolio investment - is un-
observable. Since in practice credit-ratings are only an imperfect measure of the underlying cred-
itworthiness, replacing y∗jt by j’s observed credit-rating at time t in eq.1 could make things even
worse because of the second important problem: endogeneity. Indeed, the whole idea of this paper
is to argue that y∗it and y
∗
jtwill be determined simultaneously if vij and vji are non-zero.
To identify credit risk spillovers, I therefore take inspiration from the epidemiology literature
and model the default process as a multi-stage disease with each credit-rating corresponding to a
new infection phase.
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2.2 The Default Process
2.2.1 From the “Susceptible - Infected” (SI) model to the “Solvent-Default”(SD)
one
The SI model was initially developed to analyse human disease spreading on contact networks (Ker-
mack & McKendrick (1932)). Although the process of infection is much more complex than this
two-states model, it remains a “useful simplification” to the extent that it captures the contagion
dynamics “happening at the level of networks” (Newman (2012)).
At any point in time, an individual is either susceptible or infected. Suppose that you are
susceptible - which happens with probability si. To catch the disease, one of your neighbours must
already be infected - the probability of this event is dj. Since this infected neighbour transmits
the disease at rate δ, the probability that you become infected at any point in time is:
ddi
dt
= δ
∑
j
vij {sidj} (2)
where the accolades on the right-hand side take into account the correlations (joint probabilities)
for nodes i and j to have the specified states, e.g. {sidj} is the “average probability that i is
susceptible and j is infected at the same time” (Newman (2012)). Interaction intensities vij play
a crucial role in eq.2. Two individuals, interacting with exactly the same people, could have
completely different infection probabilities if the first person’s contacts mainly include already
contaminated individuals, whereas the second one is more interlinked with still healthy people.
Translating the SI framework into a “Solvent-Default” (SD) one is rather trivial. We can simply
think of the interaction intensity vij as the strength of the potential contagion flow from j to i. For
instance, in the Eurozone network illustrated in Fig.1, the vij’s will be the TPI shares. Eq.2 implies
that two countries, Z and W, investing in exactly the same sovereigns with the only difference that∑
j vZj puts relatively higher weights on countries with larger dj than
∑
j vWj, would have very
different default probabilities. In particular, Z’s default probability would be larger than W’s.
Notice that this discrepancy would occur not because of a difference in dj, but as a consequence
of different TPI shares’ distributions.
Unfortunately, this simple SD framework is inappropriate for the investigation of credit risk
spillovers, because it only models two states: Solvent and Default. In reality, a solvent financial
institution does not suddenly declare bankruptcy; it undergoes a process of rating downgrades,
which I model as a multi-stage disease.
2.2.2 Default as a multi-stage disease
Modeling default as a multi-stage disease makes the previous framework more complex, but allows
financial institutions to differ in how solvent they are.
It might be insightful to think about each credit-rating downgrade as marking the beginning
of a new infection phase. Let θ(crit) ∈ [0; 1] be the rate at which institution i with credit-rating
crit transmits the “default disease” to its creditors. An institution with lower creditworthiness, i.e.
in a more advanced infection phase, is more likely to default itself. It should therefore be more
virulent and transmit the default contagion at a higher rate, i.e. θ(crit) must be decreasing in crit.
For simplicity, suppose there are only four possible credit-ratings (k = 4): A, B, C, and D. Let
ait, bit, cit and dit denote the probabilities that institution i has rating A, B, C, or D respectively
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at time t. Clearly:
ait + bit + cit + dit = 1
because an institution must be rated at any point in time.
Further, let the transmission rates be: θ(A) = 0 and θ(cr) ∈ (0; 1] for any cr 6= A.
Given the network of n financial institutions or states, i can be downgraded from A to B
for two reasons. Firstly, as a result of a credit risk spillover from one of its debtors. For this, i
must start with rating A which happens with probability ait. Moreover, one of its debtors must
have rating crjt ∈{B, C, D} - which happens with probabilities zjt = {bjt, cjt, djt} respectively
- and transmit the contagion at rate θ(crjt). Secondly, i could also be downgraded because of
an exogenous deterioration in one of its characteristics xit. The following differential equation
describes the probability that i loses credit-rating A:
dai
dt
= −ω
∑
j
vij {aitzjt} θ(crjt) + βAdxi
dt
(3)
Similarly, the probability that i has rating B increases in i’s probability of being downgraded
from A to B, but decreases in i’s probability of being downgraded from B to C:
dbi
dt
= ω
∑
j
vij {aitzjt} θ(crjt)− ω
∑
j
vij {bitzjt} θ(crjt) + βB dxi
dt
(4)
The differential equation for rating C is described in a similar way:
dci
dt
= ω
∑
j
vij {bitzjt} θ(crjt)− ω
∑
j
vij {citzjt} θ(crjt) + βC dxi
dt
(5)
Finally, the last downgrade from C to D corresponds to the default after which the country
exits the system:
ddi
dt
= ω
∑
j
vij {citzjt} θ(crjt) + βD dxi
dt
(6)
where the parameter on the exogenous shock β is allowed to depend on the credit rating under
consideration.
There is one important difference between this extended SD model and the existing multi-
stage disease ones from the epidemiology literature. In the latter, “the only stochastic step [...] is
transmission of the disease”(Jaquet & Pechal (2009)) - i.e. once an individual becomes infected, she
will traverse all the disease stages deterministically until reaching the final phase (e.g. becoming
resistant) - whereas in the multi-stage SD model, progression towards the next infection phase still
depends on contact with already contaminated units. 34
3Note that the infection phases of the node’s debtors do not have to be “more advanced” than its own contam-
ination phase in order to make him progress to the next infection stage. Consider the following example: country
X currently has rating B and has only two debtors: countries Y and Z, both with ratings A, i.e. in “less advanced”
infection phases than itself. If country Y is downgraded from A to B, this will increase the probability of country
X being downgraded to C, i.e. there will still be a credit-risk spillover despite the fact that country Y was initially
less infected than country X.
4Aside from the economic content of this paper, there is a need to properly understand the dynamics and
phase diagrams of a multi-stage epidemic model in which progression to the next infection phase depends on
interaction with other contaminated people. Although such a model could not be applied in common epidemic
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Figure 2: Given the initial vector of ratings (2012 Q4), this experiment simulates the contagion process showing
the evolutions of the ratings for each country.
2.3 Computer Simulations
The model presented in the previous section has no closed form solution. To analyse it, I have
written a graph-based computer algorithm whose main component is a function called spillovers.
This function takes as arguments an adjacency matrix V, a transmission-rates vector θ, and the
vector of initial ratings rat0. Firstly, it associates to each country i a transmission rate θ(cri) that
depends on its rating. After computing country-specific downgrade probabilities using eq.7, some
countries are stochastically downgraded:
Pr(i downgraded) = ω
∑
j
vijθ(crj) (7)
Here, ω ∈ R+ captures the overall spillovers’ magnitude (the “severity” of the disease) and allows
to change the speed of the simulations without altering downgrade rankings.
Spillovers’ output is a new vector of ratings: rat1. The contagion function recalls spillovers
until all countries default - which happens at time Td - using the spillovers’ previous ratings
output vector as the new input at each iteration step, and producing a matrix with columns:
rat0, rat1, rat2, ..., ratTd . Technically, one country usually remains solvent. Since the simulation
stops when all but one country default, this solvent country also defaults at Td.
Fig.2 illustrates the computer simulation on the Eurozone TPI network with the fourth quarter
2012 S&P’s credit ratings as rat0. I only use the first seventeen S&P’s ratings, grouping together
settings such as the transmission of a viral infection, it could be very useful in understanding contagious mental
illnesses. For instance, Joiner & Katz (1999) investigate 40 studies conducted between 1976-1997 “that examined
the relationship between two non-genetically related individuals’ levels of depression or negative mood”, and find
evidence of significant contagion for all the 12 studies that analysed syndromal depression spillovers between “college
roommates, dating couples, young spouses, elderly spouses, and relatives.” Interestingly, they also find that only
13 of the 28 studies dealing with negative mood, report significant spillovers, concluding that “depressive symptoms
are [. . . ] more contagious than negative mood.” This agrees with the framework used in this paper, whereby
more advanced infection phases are presented as more virulent. Hence, the model analysed in section 2 could help
understand the transition from a moderate state of depression or even a simple negative mood to more severe
phases.
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Figure 3: Given the initial vector of ratings (2012 Q4), this experiment simulates the contagion process recording
the number of downgrades each period.
ratings below or equal to CCC, and translating them into a numerical scale with the highest rating
defined as AAA = 17 and the lowest as CCC = 1. In this simulation, ω = 1 and θ is reported in
the first column of Table 5 below.
As expected, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus are the first sovereigns to default, whereas the
Netherlands, Finland, and Luxembourg are the last ones. Note that “Time” here has no specific
length and should simply be interpreted as regular time-intervals. The total number of time-
intervals depends on the values of θ and ω. In particular, setting a higher ω speeds up the overall
contagion process, whereas a smaller ω gives a more precise ranking of country default times.
Fig.2 also illustrates an interesting network phenomenon inherent to epidemics - the “tipping
point” (Gladwell (2000)). The main idea is that changes often happen very quickly and unex-
pectedly as some threshold is reached. Here “threshold” may be interpreted as a country-specific
exposure level after which its default process gains momentum. As an example, consider the evo-
lution of Germany’s credit-rating (red). It remains above AA (15) for almost 400 periods, then
suddenly plummets to CCC (1) in less than 300 time-intervals. At the network level, such tipping
points lead to contagion waves and clustering of default times. In fig.2, three main default clusters
occur around t = 400 (Portugal, Cyprus, Slovakia, Spain, and Slovenia), t = 600 (Belgium, Italy,
Ireland, France, and Germany), and soon after t = 1, 200 (Malta, Austria, The Netherlands).
To investigate this issue further, I increase the spillovers’ magnitude to ω = 10, and record the
number of downgrades over time for a particular contagion realisation. Fig.3 shows the emergence
of contagion waves. They happen as a set of countries becomes increasingly virulent and starts
transmitting downgrade spillovers at a faster pace. With each iteration of the spillovers function,
downgrade probabilities increase for all countries, making them more likely to reach their “thresh-
olds”. This process continues until some sovereigns start defaulting. At this point, downgrade
probabilities drop and the contagion process slows down because the set of highly virulent coun-
tries leaves the system. However, since downgrade probabilities for the remaining countries are
still positive, a new wave eventually emerges. In practice, this experiment suggests that in order
to lower the downgrade probabilities of still relatively healthy member-states and limit spillovers,
the set of most virulent countries should leave the system.
While further investigation of tipping points and contagion waves is an important direction
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for future research, the next step and main goal of this paper is to use the model and the com-
puter algorithm presented in this section to derive indicators of node/country importance and
vulnerability.
3 Systemic Importance and Vulnerability
3.1 Early-time properties: some analytical results
Consider again the model from subsection 2.2.2 and suppose that all n financial institutions start
with the best possible credit-rating A, i.e. ai0 = 1 for any i. Now, let one of the institutions be
exogenously downgraded. Afterwards, in order to disentangle credit risk spillovers from exogenous
economic fundamentals’ deterioration, set dxi
dt
= 0 for any i and t.
Which institutions are most likely to be downgraded from A in this early period? To answer
this question, note that since cit = 0, dit = 0, and ait + bit = 1 for any i, one only needs to focus
on eq.4 which can be rewritten as:
dbi
dt
= ω
∑
j
vijbjtθ(B)
because ait → 1 and θ(A) = 0. In matrix notation:
db
dt
= ωθ(B)Vb
which is a system of differential equations that has a solution of the following form:
b(t) =
n∑
r=1
ur(0) exp(ωθ(B)κrt)µr
where κr’s and µr’s are respectively the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix V and ur(0)’s
are some constants. Let κ1 and µ1 denote the largest eigenvalue and its associated eigenvector
respectively:
b(t) ∼ exp(ωθ(B)κ1t)µ1 (8)
Hence, thinking of b(t) as an indicator of early-time vulnerability, eq.8 shows that it will be
directly proportional to V′s right leading eigenvector κ1. In the network literature, this metric is
called (right) eigenvector centrality (Newman (2012)).
A closely-related indicator can be constructed to gauge early-time importance. The trick here
consists in taking the transpose of the adjacency matrix: W = VT so that wij = v
T
ij = vji. Now
row i of W gives the distribution of all network members’ investment shares into i. Let σ(t) denote
the vector of early-time importance. I want an indicator that ranks higher those countries, whose
major creditors are themselves more important. The differential equation of the form:
dσi
dt
= η
∑
j
vjiσjt
shows that the importance of node i is indeed increasing in the importance of its creditors σjt and
the proportion that they invest into i : vji. Rewriting in matrix notation and performing the same
exercise as above one gets:
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σ(t) ∼ exp(ηλ1t)pi1
where λ1 and pi1 are the leading left eigenvalue and eigenvector of the matrix V. Hence the vector
of early-time importance will be proportional to the left eigenvector centrality.
3.2 Late-time properties: systemic indicators
One of the main goals of this paper is to measure systemic importance and vulnerability. To build
indicators that take into account every possible feedback mechanism generated by the network
structure, I need to switch from the early-time when the contagion process just sets off, to the
time when the countries have traversed their default processes almost completely.
Conceptually, the experiment remains the same: all n institutions start with the best possible
credit-rating A, and one of the institutions is exogenously downgraded. Nevertheless, the key
difference is that instead of asking which institutions are most likely to be downgraded to rating B
first, I now ask how long will it take for institution i to default? How does this time compare to the
time needed for other institutions to default? What if I pick and downgrade another institution
first?
A bit of imagination leads to define the following two possible indicators of systemic importance:
• All-default time: T id gives the time when all of the nodes in the network default after the
initial exogenous downgrade of node i.
• First-default time: F id gives the time of the first default in the network after the initial
exogenous downgrade of node i.
Intuitively, the initial downgrade of a systemically more important country should lead to quicker
First- and All- default times (smaller F id and T
i
d).
In the same spirit, the default time of node i after the initial downgrade of node j - V ji -
identifies i’s systemic vulnerability to j. If i is more vulnerable to l than to h, we should observe:
V li < V
h
i . A summary indicator is i’s average systemic vulnerability :
V uli =
1
n
∑
j
V ji
3.3 Application to the Eurozone Sovereign debt crisis
To see how these different analytical and simulation-based indicators relate to each other, tables 2
and 3 report the computed rankings and indicators for all 17 member-states using the TPI shares
as the adjacency matrix (Table 1). Countries are arranged according to All-default (Td) and
Vulnerability (V ul) rankings respectively.
Germany alternates with France in the role of the most systemically important Eurozone coun-
try depending on the indicator used. Although Luxembourg is a small country, it is consistently
ranked second/third because other EZ members invest substantial shares into it: between 2.4%
(Cyprus) and 26.2% (Italy). Remarkably, many countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland,
Spain) keep exactly the same positions in all importance rankings. In terms of vulnerability, the
picture is less clear-cut. Slovenia and Slovakia are ranked highest by different indicators. Greece
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Table 2: Systemic Importance
Rankings Indices
LeftEig Fd Td LeftEig Fd Td
Germany 1 2 1 0.469 17.535 26.652
France 3 1 2 0.456 17.527 26.792
Luxembourg 2 3 3 0.465 17.555 26.799
Netherlands 4 4 4 0.353 17.961 27.197
Italy 5 5 5 0.320 18.019 27.431
Ireland 6 6 6 0.233 18.319 27.577
Spain 7 7 7 0.225 18.543 28.109
Austria 8 8 8 0.102 20.548 29.987
Belgium 9 9 9 0.090 21.085 30.776
Portugal 10 10 10 0.058 22.250 31.840
Greece 12 11 11 0.022 22.767 33.724
Finland 11 12 12 0.036 24.862 34.559
Cyprus 15 13 13 0.003 35.323 46.868
Slovenia 13 14 14 0.005 43.168 53.474
Slovakia 14 15 15 0.004 47.989 58.222
Estonia 17 16 16 0.000 369.900 379.521
Malta 16 17 17 0.001 429.148 438.018
Note: LeftEig = Left eigenvector centrality, Fd = First default time, Td = All default time
Table 3: Systemic Vulnerability
Rankings Indices
RightEig Vul RightEig Vul
Slovakia 3 1 0.308 70.149
Slovenia 1 2 0.310 70.238
Estonia 5 3 0.288 70.352
Belgium 2 4 0.309 70.432
Spain 4 5 0.296 70.496
Portugal 6 6 0.287 70.518
Austria 7 7 0.274 70.549
France 9 8 0.265 70.637
Germany 10 9 0.262 70.652
Italy 8 10 0.273 70.667
Netherlands 11 11 0.213 71.136
Cyprus 15 12 0.135 71.293
Finland 12 13 0.178 72.106
Luxembourg 13 14 0.178 72.198
Malta 14 15 0.136 74.018
Ireland 16 16 0.135 75.959
Greece 17 17 0.093 77.599
Note: RightEig = Right eigenvector centrality, Vul = Average vulnerability
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Table 4: Robustness simulations
Simulation 2 (different θ) Simulation 3 (different ω)
Fd2 Td2 Vul2 Fd3 Td3 Vul3
Index R Index R Index R Index R Index R Index R
Austria 74.290 8 86.760 8 617.601 7 27.339 8 56.691 8 128.670 8
Belgium 81.050 9 94.200 9 617.332 3 28.277 9 57.834 9 127.504 1
Cyprus 232.962 13 253.988 13 618.879 12 62.441 13 90.615 13 132.343 11
Estonia 4231.200 16 4243.600 16 617.475 5 714.407 16 744.862 16 127.866 4
Finland 126.770 12 139.011 12 620.943 14 36.237 11 65.681 12 134.305 13
France 39.512 2 50.385 2 617.674 8 20.961 1 50.164 1 129.066 10
Germany 39.140 1 49.989 1 617.777 9 21.018 3 50.758 2 128.825 9
Greece 83.683 10 104.333 10 624.523 17 37.772 12 64.946 11 150.784 16
Ireland 49.159 6 62.703 6 622.238 16 22.818 6 52.158 6 151.436 17
Italy 44.847 5 57.869 5 617.872 10 22.062 5 51.954 4 128.310 7
Luxembourg 39.627 3 50.399 3 619.867 13 20.974 2 51.633 3 138.959 14
Malta 4525.400 17 4537.400 17 621.473 15 879.368 17 909.022 17 139.594 15
Netherlands 43.846 4 56.643 4 618.813 11 21.790 4 52.097 5 132.440 12
Portugal 93.860 11 107.579 11 617.499 6 30.652 10 59.459 10 127.976 5
Slovakia 364.315 15 377.453 15 616.502 1 83.556 15 115.409 15 127.579 2
Slovenia 301.904 14 315.323 14 616.656 2 74.789 14 106.016 14 127.666 3
Spain 51.559 7 64.515 7 617.398 4 23.247 7 52.769 7 127.978 6
Note: R = Ranking
is ranked lowest probably because most of its investment flows into the UK with only 26.1% re-
maining in the EZ. The interpretation of all the results is necessarily limited and future research
should test the model on a larger dataset.
To check whether these results depend on the specific values assumed for θ and ω in the
computer simulations, table 4 contains the results from two additional simulations: with a different
θ (simulation 2), and a different ω (simulation 3). I arrange countries alphabetically and report all
three simulation-based indicators. The parametrization of all simulations is summarized in table 5.
Rankings remain almost identical. Indeed as table 6 shows, the ranking correlations of All-
default times, First-default times, and Vulnerability indicators across all three simulations are
almost perfect.
Table 6 also sheds more light on the relationships between different indicators. There is signifi-
cant positive correlation within the two sets of importance and vulnerability rankings, but negative
correlation between them (bottom-left part). The positive within correlation suggests that the in-
dicators capture indeed the same node characteristic (either importance or vulnerability). The
difference in rankings reflects the presence of endogenous risk generated by the network structure
itself. The negative between correlation shows that the sets of most important and most vulnerable
countries do not overlap. Such a situation may lead to moral hazard problems if the most system-
ically important players do not bear the full network costs of idiosyncratic shocks affecting them,
i.e. they do not internalize the negative externality generated on the most vulnerable countries,
and take on more risks than would be socially desirable.
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Table 5: Simulations parametrization
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Positive contagion
Shock ω 100 100 50
No. simulations 10,000 10,000 10,000
Credit-rating Transmission rates
CCC 0.2958 0.1372 0.2958 0
B- 0.1479 0.1143 0.1479 0.0007
B 0.0986 0.1067 0.0986 0.0027
B+ 0.0739 0.0991 0.0739 0.0060
BB- 0.0592 0.0915 0.0592 0.0107
BB 0.0493 0.0838 0.0493 0.0167
BB+ 0.0423 0.0762 0.0423 0.0241
BBB- 0.0370 0.0686 0.0370 0.0328
BBB 0.0329 0.0610 0.0329 0.0428
BBB+ 0.0296 0.0457 0.0296 0.0541
A- 0.0269 0.0381 0.0269 0.0668
A 0.0246 0.0305 0.0246 0.0809
A+ 0.0227 0.0229 0.0227 0.0963
AA- 0.0211 0.0152 0.0211 0.1130
AA 0.0197 0.0076 0.0197 0.1310
AA+ 0.0185 0.0015 0.0185 0.1504
AAA 0 0 0 0.1711
Note: For Malta and Estonia the no. of simulations is 1,000
Table 6: Ranking correlations for Importance and Vulnerability indicators
LEig Fd1 Td1 Fd2 Td2 Fd3 Td3 REig Vul1 Vul2 Vul3
LEig 1
Fd1 0.980 1
Td1 0.985 0.998 1
Fd2 0.980 0.995 0.998 1
Td2 0.980 0.995 0.998 1 1
Fd3 0.980 0.995 0.990 0.985 0.985 1
Td3 0.978 0.998 0.995 0.993 0.993 0.993 1
REig -0.115 -0.157 -0.159 -0.186 -0.186 -0.152 -0.149 1
Vul1 -0.199 -0.213 -0.216 -0.243 -0.243 -0.216 -0.211 0.961 1
Vul2 -0.132 -0.152 -0.154 -0.181 -0.181 -0.154 -0.149 0.968 0.990 1
Vul3 -0.208 -0.223 -0.221 -0.248 -0.248 -0.228 -0.211 0.953 0.961 0.961 1
14
4 Positive Contagion
“We spoke a lot about contagion when
things go poorly but I believe there is a
positive contagion when things go well. ”
Mario Draghi, summer 2012
4.1 A world of two contagions
In the model analysed up to now, the only possible transition for countries was downwards. For
instance, in the simple model with only four ratings from subsection 2.2.2, I had:
A→ B → C → D
In reality however, countries can also be upgraded; and as Draghi’s quotation suggests, the
sign of contagion is probably determined on a daily basis by market news and sentiments. An
announcement like the “Draghi Put” or a successful summit might lead to a round of positive
contagion, whereas a failed government bonds auction or the publication of exorbitant youth
unemployment rates may induce negative contagion. In this more realistic world of two contagions
- positive and negative - the transition pattern becomes:
A B  C → D
Akin to negative credit spillovers, positive ones occur if institution/sovereign i’s initial upgrade
leads to an increase in the upgrade probabilities of its creditors. This section extends the basic
default model with only four credit ratings to allow for this possibility.
For simplicity, I ignore the exogenous factors that could lead to upgrades and downgrades and
concentrate on credit changes that happen because of credit spillovers. Let ξ(crit) ∈ [0; 1] be the
rate at which institution i with credit-rating crit transmits a positive spillover to its creditors. In
this case, the positive transmission rates vector ξ shall be increasing in cr, reflecting the fact that it
becomes easier for an institution to transmit positive spillovers as its rating rises. Since a defaulted
organisation cannot transmit positive spillovers, I further simplify the vector as: ξ(D) = 0, and
ξ(cr) ∈ (0; 1] for any cr 6= D.
For institution i to be upgraded from B to A thanks to a positive credit spillover from one of its
debtors j, it must itself have rating B at the outset - which happens with probability bit, one of its
debtors must have rating crjt ∈{A, B, C} - which happens with probabilities ψjt = {ajt, bjt, cjt}
respectively - and transmit the positive spillover at rate ξ(crjt).
In a world of two contagions, the differential equation that describes the probability that i has
rating A at any point in time is therefore:
dai
dt
= −ω
∑
j
vij {aitzjt} θ(crjt) + φ
∑
j
vij {bitψjt} ξ(crjt) (9)
where φ ∈ R+ captures the magnitude of the positive spillovers. Here I assume that both contagions
propagate through the same network - the network of investment shares with adjacency matrix
V. A more complex and realistic model would allow positive and negative contagions to spread
through multiple and/or different networks.
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Similarly, the probability that i has rating B increases in i’s probability of being downgraded
from A to B, decreases in i’s probability of being downgraded from B to C, decreases in i’s
probability of being upgraded from B to A, and increases in i’s probability of being upgraded from
C to B.
dbi
dt
= ω
∑
j
vij {aitzjt} θ(crjt)−ω
∑
j
vij {bitzjt} θ(crjt)−φ
∑
j
vij {bitψjt} ξ(crjt)+φ
∑
j
vij {citψjt} ξ(crjt)
(10)
Since once defaulted, an institution can no longer be upgraded, the probability that i has rating
C increases in i’s probability of being downgraded from B to C, decreases in i’s probability of
being downgraded from C to D, and decreases in i’s probability of being upgraded from C to B:
dci
dt
= ω
∑
j
vij {bitzjt} θ(crjt)− ω
∑
j
vij {citzjt} θ(crjt)− φ
∑
j
vij {citψjt} ξ(crjt) (11)
Finally, the probability of defaulting remains as before:
ddi
dt
= ω
∑
j
vij {citzjt} θ(crjt) (12)
Note that this is a more general version of the model presented in subsection 2.2.2 where φ -
the magnitude of positive spillovers - was equal to zero, i.e. the positive contagion channel was
shut down.5
4.2 Can positive contagion save the Eurozone?
“Where’s your positive contagion now,
Mr. Draghi?”
J. Warner, The Telegraph (05/02/2013)
To analyse this more complex model through computer simulations I define:
Pr(i upgraded) = φ
∑
j
vijξ(crj) (13)
The new extended spillovers’ function in the computer algorithm, now associates to each
country i two transmission rates θ(cri) and ξ(cri). After computing country-specific downgrade
and upgrade probabilities using equations 7 and 13, some countries are stochastically downgraded
and upgraded producing a new vector of ratings.
Whether positive contagion ultimately dominates its negative counterpart will depend both on
the transmission rates vectors ξ and θ, and the respective spillover magnitudes ω and φ. While
5Following my discussion in footnote 4 about how this multi-stage epidemic model might be used in the context
of contagious mental illnesses, note that this extended version with both positive and negative contagions could
allow researchers to investigate in a more systematic way “how depressed people’s well-being is enhanced or eroded
by positive and negative social interactions.”(Kashdan & Steger (2009)) Different networks, reflecting the type and
intensity of the interaction between people, could be used to propagate the latter.
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Figure 4: ω = 1; φ = 0.3
Figure 5: ω = 1; φ = 0.2
future research shall investigate this important issue in a more details, figures 4 and 5 illustrate
how, for given ξ, θ and ω, lowering the positive contagion magnitude φ from 0.3 to 0.2 changes
the scenario from one where most of the countries finish with rating AAA, to a more morose one,
with complex spillover dynamics.6
This suggests that unless Mr. Draghi manages to make “things go well [enough]”, we will have
difficulty in noticing positive contagion.
6The positive transmission-rates vector used is reported in Table 5.
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5 Conclusion and Future Research
“The deadliest aspect of the Eurozone
crisis is the tripwire linking the riskiness
of banks and governments.”
Acharya et al. (2010)
Most of the literature on financial contagion in networks has concentrated on analysing how an
initial default of a bank or country triggers a cascade of further failures. The Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis however has demonstrated that although defaults are likely to be prevented, credit-
rating downgrades occur rather often. Since credit-ratings are one of the key drivers of investment
decisions, a model explaining credit risk spillovers could help understand the observed reallocation
of investors’ portfolios in response to changes in the creditworthiness of interlinked countries or
banks. To identify such credit risk spillovers, this paper models the process of default as a multi-
stage disease with each credit-rating corresponding to a different infection phase. I use the model
to develop indicators of systemic importance and vulnerability by investigating how the initial
exogenous change in the creditworthiness of one of the members of the financial network impacts
the creditworthiness of all the other ones.
The illustration of the model in the context of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis yields in-
teresting and intuitive results. For example, I find that France and Germany occupy the highest
positions in the systemic importance hierarchy. However, the interpretation of all the results is
necessarily limited by the small dataset. Future research should include more countries and test
the model on interbank data, as well as investigate more carefully such phenomena as tipping
points and contagion waves. The above quote from Acharya et al. (2010) implies that governments
and banks are closely interlinked. Hence further research should not only analyse the networks of
banks and governments separately, but also investigate how an initial shock in one of the networks
could potentially engender contagion in the other one, or even change its structure.
The literature has focused almost exclusively on negative contagion. However, policymakers
seem to be aware that the same endogenous feedback mechanisms that yield negative financial
contagion, could in principle be used to activate positive spillovers and shift investors’ sentiments.
Unfortunately, the extension of the model to include such positive spillovers shows that even though
positive contagion could be an attractive solution to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the main
policy question remains how to generate it permanently, halting its negative counterpart. Another
task for further research is therefore to examine how the ratio of positive to negative spillover
magnitudes determines the overall sign of contagion.
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